Existence History and Technology ProblemJune 27, 2021
Heidegger focuses on the history of existence in the 1930s. When we compare the work we know as Being and Time with the plan at the beginning of the book, we realize that the original plan was not realized. The third part of the first book devoted to destruction and the second book were not written.
Does this mean that Heidegger has abandoned the destructive part of his philosophical project? No, because he makes the destruction he designed in his works that follow Being and Time and carry different names. So why not do this destruction in the framework of Being and Time? Commentators seeking an answer to this question attribute Heidegger’s incomplete completion of Being and Time to a change of ground, a turn (Kehre) in his thinking. Although Being and Time is a revolt against the philosophy of the subject, Heidegger will still find the starting point of Being and Time “subjective” after completing it. Because the relationship of man with being has been handled by analyzing the existence of Dasein. The relation to Being is nowhere if not in Dasein’s understanding. However, in order to succeed in the attempt of destruction, it is necessary to consider the relationship of man with existence from the beginning. This of course means transcending Being and Time, but the term “transcending” does not imply that what has been done in this work is unnecessary or misconstrued. On the contrary, it is the steps he took in Being and Time that brought Heidegger to this second stage of his research.
Why is a destruction needed to answer the question of the meaning of existence? When we understand a concept of philosophy today, we relate to a certain historical interpretation of it. But does the interpretation in question show us the original, original meaning of the notion? No, important events in the history of existence, the interpretation of the concept of tekhne by Aristotle, the emergence of a creative concept of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the thought of creation as “production”, “manufacture”, etc., transform the way other basic concepts are understood. Destruction puts Heidegger in a “hermeneutic” reflection in the history of philosophy. For example, he explains why Husserl or Kant made a certain conceptual decision, took a certain strategic step, by going back to their relationship with Descartes. He reads Descartes in the light of interpretations made in the Middle Ages. Thus, Heidegger constantly shakes the judgments that organize and structure the philosophical corpus, and while doing this, he makes us feel that there is a continuity, a unity of metaphysics, but that it is necessary to think of this unity as a historical movement. The hermeneutic dimension of this philosophy, of course, shows that it has a strong historical consciousness. The 19th century thinker Wilhelm Dilthey has an influence on this. However, Heidegger also takes this historical consciousness from his relationship with German idealism and Hegel.
The fundamental question of Heidegger’s thought, at least in 1927, is the question of the meaning of being. But can this question have an answer or a single answer? It can be thought that the more different people there are, the more and more different the meaning of existence can be. However, people living in the same age do not understand existence very differently. In various ages of existence, being is said under various names, Plato considered it idea, Aristotle ousia, energeia, Medieval God, while the modern age considers it as cogito, consciousness, transcendent consciousness, will, will to power. Although there are philosophers or thinkers who give a name to existence and think about it by finding a term; An entire age eventually comes under the domination of this mode of understanding of being. Metaphysics also spreads to daily life, and affects all the relationships that an ordinary person unaware of metaphysics establishes with existing ones. Heidegger considers the process of changing these names as the history or destiny of being (Geschick des Seins). Destiny is like a letter sent from one address to another and opened and read many times before it reaches its recipient. By constructing such a narrative, Heidegger gives philosophy an identity of essentially Ancient Greek origin. But to say that philosophy is Ancient Greek is for Heidegger to say that philosophy is Western or European. It is as if the fate of existence makes the ancient Greeks and modern Europe the beginning and the end of the same adventure. So what is the direction of this adventure? Does it include an improvement or progress? At this point, Heidegger’s thought takes the form of a critique of modernity. The age we live in is the “age of technology”, in this age we understand existence as energy that can be stored and stored to be used when necessary, and we reveal and experience the existing ones within this understanding. Technology is not just mechanization: the essence of technology is a way of revealing and knowing. Seeing or revealing the being as a source of energy also prevents the being from appearing as something else. The truth of being in the age of technology is Gestell, that is, framing. Is the real problem of this age the dominance of the instrumental mind, the instrumentalization of everything? Evaluation of everything as beneficial