Hans Georg Gadamer and Philosophical Hermeneutics

Hans Georg Gadamer and Philosophical Hermeneutics

June 28, 2021 Off By Felso

Dilthey is the person Gadamer reckoned with in formulating his own philosophical views. Therefore, it seems appropriate to first consider how he criticizes Dilthey, and then examine how he bases his own philosophical views on it. Gadamer Dilthey’s attempt to ground the spiritual sciences epistemologically is in Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method).

He criticized it under the title of “The Transition from the Problem of Epistemological Grounding of History to the Hermeneutic Grounding of the Spiritual Sciences” and summarized his own attitude towards it under this title.

According to Gadamer, “Dilthey has determined his place in treating the historical world-conception as an epistemological problem, as opposed to the idealism’s conception of the same world” (Gadamer 1960: 205). In this case, the two traditions he opposes—19. He was torn between 19th century positivism and German idealism—and this split affected his entire philosophy. Dilthey’s aim is to complement Kant’s “critique of pure reason” with a “critique of historical reason”. Because historical reason, like pure reason, needs justification. Just as the epoch-making result of the critique of pure reason has not only been to smash metaphysics, a pure science of reason about the universe, the soul, and God, but also to show how pure natural science is possible, the same must be done for the science of history, how the science of history is possible, Kant ‘s effort should be shown by example. Because 19th century. Both positivism and German Idealism are wrong on this issue (Gadamer 1960: 206). Idealist discourse claimed that reason dominates the world and history and knows it. However, according to Dilthey, idealist philosophy could not achieve what Kant had achieved for natural sciences, and could not go beyond being dogmatist (Gadamer 1960: 207). Therefore, the possibility of a pure historical science should be investigated in order to ground historical knowledge philosophically. By determining the location of the categories that make it possible to know, Kant’s contribution to the establishment of phenomena should be taken as an example, and historical world categories that have the power to carry the historical world should be found (Gadamer 1960: 208). According to Dilthey, what carries the historical world is not the facts obtained through experience, as the English empiricists thought, on the contrary, the basis on which this world rests is the “internal historicity” (inere Geschichtlichkeit) or inner experience, that is, the experience of living (Gadamer), which makes the experience itself possible. 1960: 208): The actual experience is the “experience of living”; This is also the object of the historical sciences, so these sciences turn to what has been lived, and rethink what has already been thought for the experience of living.

According to Gadamer, Dilthey did not see any harm in questioning it epistemologically, since the historical world to which he was directed is always a world created by the human spirit. Because what needs to be revealed is how to reveal the individual’s experience and knowledge about historical experience. Dilthey asked how the individual connects with life, and starting from this, he attempted to obtain the concepts that are carriers for the historical context and the knowledge of this context. “Experience” (Erlebnis) is the ultimate certainty sought for knowledge of the historical world; it is an immanence in itself that cannot be further separated: experience has an immediate certainty. Therefore, Dilthey investigated how life came into existence and how knowledge of the same life would be possible based on “experience”. This inquiry led Dilthey to consider the structure of psychic life (Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens). Dilthey’s use of the concept of structure here has a special meaning. Using this concept, Dilthey has shown that he emphasizes not on temporary psychic influences that flow over time, but on the integrity of the inner connections of psychic life (Gadamer 1960: 210). Dilthey believed that he had achieved a special and carrier point of departure on this basis, and he transcended the historical individuals of the German History School by connecting with the “transcendental subject”. Although life is understood in terms of individual experiences, they mean something from the whole of life; therefore, they can only be understood in relation to the whole. According to Gadamer, Dilthey replaced the real subject with the “logical subject” in order to ground the sciences of the spirit epistemologically, and denied the historicity of the subject.

Unlike Dilthey, who treats all aspects of the historical world as objects in which the spirit recognizes itself, Hegel, on the other hand, deals with the spirit’s self-return and self-knowledge on the basis of conceptual philosophy. This is where Dilhey finds Hegel dogmatic. Because Dilthey does not consider philosophy as a knowledge, but as an expression of life. All aspects of the historical world, including speculative philosophy, are objects in which the spirit recognizes itself. According to Dilthey, the spirit’s knowledge of itself takes place not in speculative conceptual knowledge, but in historical consciousness. Size