Refutation of Idealism

Refutation of Idealism

June 27, 2021 Off By Felso

English realism owes its beginnings to a very original article by Cambridge professor G. E. Moore (1873-1958). This article, titled “Refutation of Idealism”, will be published in the British philosophy journal Mind in 1903.

(The article is also featured in Moore’s Philosophical Studies. In this article, Moore, following in the footsteps of the German Phenomenologist Meinong, sets out the distinctions between the act of having knowledge and the object of knowledge, and will attempt a Berkeley-style refutation of idealism. He also outlines his own realistic epistemology (the theory of knowledge). He claims that Berkeley failed to make a sharp distinction between the act of knowledge and the known object. He incorrectly concluded that only known objects exist. Any object of knowledge, such as blue sensation exists only as perceived. Berkeley, from a confusion between sensation as a conscious act of sensation, such as the sensed object. Sensation of blue is a conscious or mental act that exists only in consciousness. But, as a “object” of sensation, sense of blue is also undetected or unsensed. Moore: “So in every sense, unit b We have two separate elements, one that we call consciousness and one that we call consciousness object.”

Berkeley’s identification of esse (essence) with percipi (perception) leads to an ambiguity in the term sensation. This term denotes both the act of sensing and the sensed subject. The act of sensing can be seen because it is ‘transparent’ or transparent, blue is easy to observe, but we cannot say the same for the blue sensation. we can reach or exist without being sensed as a reaching sensory object, its essence (esse) is not perception (percipi).Moore refutes Berkeley’s essential and necessary introduction and sets out other forms of idealism by revealing the difference between conscious sensation and its object, but not idealism. The refutation of the esse estpercipi (essence is perception) proposition destroys the main premise of the idealistic position developed by Berkeley and echoed by Fichte, Schopenhouer, Bradley, Royce, and others in the idealistic tradition. the door will open and the British and American It will provide the impetus for the realism current.

Realism, which has a structural epistemological position, is separate and independent from the knowledged act of the knowledge object. Structural realism applied to Moore’s sense perception would be published in 1914 as “Status on Sense-data”. In this paper, the question of whether sense-knowledges, or to put it in Moore’s terms, sensations, exist even when they are not subject to any experience at all, is raised.

Moore will then pose the problem of correlations between sensory information and physical objects. By physical objects the term refers to objects such as a coin, which are circles when viewed from above, but which we see from different perspectives as ellipses when viewed from leather. It is thought to have an internal and external aspect. Moore treats sensory information as he perceives the coin. It exists even when it is undetected. The physical object does not have such an independent state. The coin as a physical object can only ‘if certain conditions are met or any other winter can directly affect certain other states’. The coin exists before we see it, Moore, weakens initial realism in the field of sense information application. His realism is the opposite of Lock’s position. The subjectivism of sensory attributes is combined with the realism of physical objects.

Prepared by: Sociologist Ömer YILDIRIM
Source: Omer YILDIRIM’s Personal Lecture Notes. Atatürk University Sociology Department 1st Year “Introduction to Philosophy” and 2nd, 3rd, 4th Grade “History of Philosophy” Lecture Notes (Ömer YILDIRIM); Open Education Philosophy Textbook