Searle and language rules

Searle and language rules

June 27, 2021 Off By Felso

Searle talked about his actions on the theory of speech and action and mostly on the rules of language. It shows a connection with the “Wittgenstein tradition”, which is the meaning of speech action together with usage rules.

Searle, G.C.J. He accepted the distinction between regulatory and constitutive rules mentioned in “Linguistic Rules” by Midgley. Here, while the creator rules created a new course of action, the regulator also edited the rules in the already existing course of action. This is like governing traffic on the street with rules, but none of these rules are necessary for traffic. In contrast, the rules of the game of chess are constructive. In other words, if someone who plays chess does not know the (constitutive) rules of the game, he cannot play chess, at most he plays another game on the chessboard. Starting from Midgley’s “Linguistic Rules”, Searle claimed to define the rules he created for the basic elements of the theory of meaning and to create it through the constitutive rules of the language.

Searle states that “To speak a language is to perform language actions in connection with systems embellished with ground rules”. Although Wittgenstein’s later philosophy tends to defy rules, there is an important difference between the two philosophers. While Searle was trying to establish a systematic language rule, Wittgenstein was also opposed to the systematic formation of colloquial language. While Searle’s efforts to systematize the language in question were beneficial for linguistic studies, they remained controversial within the scope of language philosophy. Nevertheless, the question of how the formation and validity of some linguistic rules emerges may come to mind. These rules are debatable because (unlike game and traffic rules) they are not clearly stated or written down. On the contrary, language rules must imply in practice.

A person who uses his language well uses the rules of the language he uses without knowing why. The occurrence of such a problem confirms Donald Davidson’s rejection of the concept of rule. Robert Brandon, on the other hand, insisted on the concept of rule and tried to prove how linguistic rules exist in line with a common practice.