Searle’s Understanding of Realism (Realism) and Relativism (Relativism)

Searle’s Understanding of Realism (Realism) and Relativism (Relativism)

June 27, 2021 Off By Felso

The main task of the concept of formation in Searle’s ontology of social events is to ensure that it is popularly called formationist. This is not the case when Searle wants to limit the formationist theses in the field of social reality. Here comes Searle’s distinction between observational and non-observational events.

The social world consists of observational events, since the formation of social realities can be talked about. On the other hand, natural sciences describe events that have not occurred and are not based on observation. As opposed to general formationist situations, these critical approaches refer to a general philosophical situation, which Searle has emphasized too much in recent years. Searle tried to interpret the concepts of “reality”, “rationalism” (rationalism) and “truth” in a traditional and robust way, as opposed to relativistic philosophical currents.

In addition, Searle saw the real and hypothetical relativism (relativism) of writers such as Richard Rotry and Jacques Derrida not only as philosophical incredulity, but also as a political danger. In particular, Searle has proven philosophically that the traditional definition of the rationality, truth, and truth of our speech is not understood. Rotry countered this transcendent proof as follows: “Wherever Searle sees the conditions of intelligibility and conjecture, I argue that users should be faithful to large and powerful objects, namely the inner being of truth, that those applications should mediate users’ feelings by rhetorical and ornate writing. I think.”