The Subject of Ibn Rushd’s Source of KnowledgeJune 27, 2021
In the context of causality, which constitutes the possibility of knowledge for Ibn Rushd, it is clear that for the accuracy and reliability of human knowledge, there must be nature and special effects that determine the nature of beings.
When we talk about the nature, nature and effect or essential function of something, we are talking about its form. Because knowing something, in a way, means defining it, and definition consists of genus and chapter, which means the competence of that thing, that is, its form. Since obtaining these depends on the abstraction of form from matter, according to our philosopher, first of all, it should be investigated whether this is possible. (Ibn Rushd, 1958: 8)
Ibn Rushd mentions that the objects subject to human perception have two forms, one being “heard” (hayûlâni) and the other being “intelligible” (ma’kûl). “Sensible/spiritual forms” (es-suveru’l-heyûlâniyye) combine with the first matter and form simple bodies (earth, water, air and fire) starting from the four qualities consisting of wetness-dryness and coldness-temperature, which emerge in the imagination of inorganic and organic beings. It emerges at different levels, up to projections or images. They (a) actually exist and change only through their coexistence with matter, (b) divide and multiply by the division of bodies that have their bases, (c) consist of two elements, one of which is matter and the other is form, that is, they are combined, and (d) they are intelligible with their concrete existence. are different from each other. (Ibn Rushd, 1958: 73- 74) As for “intelligible forms” (suveru’l-ma’kûlat): (a) Their concepts and imaginary forms as their concrete existence are not completely separate from each other; because, although they have some particular qualities, imaginary images are also abstract like concepts.
(b) Concepts, when perceived as being free from matter and particularity, are eternal – both in the sense that an infinite number of individuals are comprehended, and in the sense that they do not change in response to the change of the individuals that fall within and perceive it; however, they are not considered separate/matterless (mufârık) and eternal in the real sense. (c) Concepts identify with the mind that perceives them; However, this is not the case for the senses and sensible forms. (d) Since the mind, which is a spiritual substance, perceives concepts through abstraction, this perception does not cause any passivity or change in it. (Ibn Rushd, 1958: 75-78) As it can be seen, the spectral form, that is, the audible form, is related to the concrete and particular (partial) dimension of the object, and the intelligible form, that is, the concept, is related to its universal dimension. In that case, it is not possible for the cognitive power that perceives the forms of the first kind and the power of understanding that perceives the metaphysical principles and causes of the beings with the second kind of forms to be one and the same.
Prepared by: Sociologist Ömer YILDIRIM
Source: Omer YILDIRIM’s Personal Lecture Notes. Atatürk University Sociology Department 1st Year “Introduction to Philosophy” and 2nd, 3rd, 4th Grade “History of Philosophy” Lecture Notes (Ömer YILDIRIM); Open Education Philosophy Textbook; SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences