What is Ibn Rushd’s Existence and What Kind of Relationship?

What is Ibn Rushd’s Existence and What Kind of Relationship?

June 27, 2021 Off By Felso

Evaluating “existence” as the audible aspect of something and the “being” as the intelligible aspect of the same thing, Ibn Rushd likens existence to the first matter (ephemeral) as form, and the relation of being-being to matter-form. Just as the first matter and the form do not really exist separately, they always exist together and can only be separated from each other in the mind, so is the entity-thing relationship.

According to Ibn Rushd, kinship is an essential common quality that enables each essence (personality) to exist and be determined in the external world on the one hand, and to form species and genera (universals, universals) with the mind’s abstraction from them, on the other hand. In other words, being cannot be found by itself independently of “being” outside the mind or in the external world (ontological level). For example, “humanity”, which is a being, does not exist in the external world as something independent of and beyond individual people. In the same way, the “definition” that indicates what and the “universal” that make up the definition do not exist independently of the “particulars” they define or assume, and are not identical with any of them. According to Ibn Rushd, definitions and universals that indicate quiddity and quiddity exist in particulars as essential qualities “in the form of potency” (bilkuve), and as “concepts” (imagination) obtained as a result of the abstraction of the mind, they exist in the mind “actually” (epistemological level). ).

The definition of something, that is, talking about what it is, also means its actual existence. In this case, the knowledge of the existence of something is prior to the knowledge of what it is; however, this does not mean that the “being” and “being” of that thing are separate things. Therefore, our philosopher is of the opinion that being and what can be separated only in the mind, not in the external world. According to him, the mental is not the thing itself, but the definition that shows it and the universal concepts that make up the definition. As a result, Ibn Rushd sees the naivety not in the mind and the universal like Avicenna, but in the external world and the particular like Aristotle; He argues that the distinction between being and being has only an epistemological and logical value, not an ontological one. (Sarioglu, 2006: 161-166).

According to Ibn Rushd, it is the “most general genus” that exists in the meaning of essence and finds its expression in ten categories, one of which is substance and nine of which are accident. In terms of being self-sufficient, always the subject and never being a predicate, the substance is considered identical with the existent, and it is the human, plant, star, stone, etc. particular entities and their principles and elements are ores. Assuming that the accidents that are dependent on the substance for their existence and survival are considered existing is not by means of full sharing (astiraq mahz) and full conformity (tevâtu’), but by a kind of “ordered sharing” (teskik). That is, accidents are called “existing” only in the sense that any noun or universal concept is used for things that are related to the same thing but have a difference between them in priority and after.